State Ownership and Corruption by Billon, Steve & Gillanders, Robert
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
State Ownership and Corruption
Steve Billon and Robert Gillanders
April 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55600/
MPRA Paper No. 55600, posted 1. May 2014 06:47 UTC
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff  
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Ownership and Corruption 
 
 
Steve Billon 
Aalto University and HECER 
 
and  
 
Robert Gillanders 
Aalto University and HECER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 378 
April 2014 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014 
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,  
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
 
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 378 
 
State Ownership and Corruption* 
 
Abstract 
 
Using data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, we test two interesting results that 
emerge from the theoretical model presented in Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies 
bargaining between politicians and managers of state-owned firms. Shleifer and Vishny's 
model suggests that firms with more state ownership should tend to pay less in bribes but 
not have a different experience of costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our 
full sample, the results suggest that a one percent increase in state ownership is 
associated with a $125 reduction in the total annual informal payment of the firm and with 
a 0.5% decrease in the probability that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to 
their current operations. We refine these average relationships somewhat by splitting the 
sample by global region. Only in our Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong 
evidence in support of the first result and in this sample we find a signifcant effect of state 
ownership on obstacles. In our Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and Caribbean 
samples we do not find a significant effect on either corruption outcome. 
 
JEL Classification: D73, G32, L32, L33, P31 
 
Keywords: state ownership, corruption, privatisation, bribery 
 
 
 
Steve Billon    Robert Gillanders 
 
Department of Economics  Department of Economics 
Aalto University   Aalto University 
P.O. Box 21240   P.O. Box 21240 
FI-00076 AALTO   FI-00076 AALTO 
FINLAND    FINLAND 
 
 
e-mail: steve.billon@aalto.fi  e-mail: rgillanders@gmail.com  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* We are very grateful to Tine Jeppesen who kindly provided us with a cleaned version of 
the Enterprise Survey firm level dataset. Michael Breen and Pertti Haaparanta provided 
useful comments and suggestions. 
1 Introduction
In the traditional public finance approach, the intervention of the state is often seen as an
efficient cure to solve market failures such as the inadequate provision of public goods or
the presence of externalities in the consumption or in the production of a private good.
In this view, the objectives of politicians who influence public enterprises are in line with
those of the general public and state-owned enterprises help to maximise social welfare as
they internalise the social cost in the decision process of production, yielding an efficient
outcome. In contrast, Shleifer (1998) argues that self-interested politicians exchange votes
from political supporters for benefits to these particular interest groups or directly extract
bribes from the state-owned enterprise, so that state ownership leads to inefficiency and
corruption.
Empirically, the literature suggests that a reallocation of ownership in state-owned en-
terprises in favour of private ownership does not seem to lead to less corruption non-
ambiguously. For instance, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) highlight that the experience
of sharp privatisation in the transition economies of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were accompanied by a substantial increase in the per-
ception of corruption as well as the relative importance of the unofficial economy. However,
they argue that it is possible to design optimal programs of privatisation that reduce the
opportunities for corruption by government officials.
Few models have been developed to analyse theoretically the relationship between the own-
ership structure of enterprises and corruption. Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005) stress a link
between market concentration and corruption that works in two ways. On the one hand,
the search for rent extraction may lead politicians to strategically sell a public enterprise to
one enterprise that will obtain a monopoly position. The rational behind such behaviour
is that it maximises the acquisition price of a state-owned enterprise. On the other hand,
the acquiring firm in the post-privatized economy may benefit from its newly monopolistic
position to engage in corruption in order to secure its advantage. In this case, privatisation
leads to more corruption through a greater concentration of the privatised market.
Another notable contribution is provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). In this paper,
we use their model to investigate how a reallocation of ownership in firms affects their
experience of corruption. The model is composed of three agents: the public sector (the
Treasury) which owns a share of firms, the politician and the firm’s manager. The politician
and the manager interact with each other through bribes and obstacles imposed on firms.
In equilibrium, the politician set obstacles in such a way that he equalises the marginal
benefit from the obstacles on enterprises with their marginal cost. We then look at the effect
of a reallocation of ownership on obstacles and bribes. In line with the experience of the
privatisation in the FSU and CEE countries, we find that a decrease in state ownership leads
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to an increase in the level of bribes. However, the level of obstacles imposed does not change
with state ownership.
We then bring these theoretical results to the data. For this purpose we use the World Bank’s
Enterprise Survey (WBES) which provides detailed information at the firm level. We are
especially interested in the firms’ experience of corruption, measured both in terms of bribe
amounts and the degree to which they feel corruption is an obstacle to their operations. Our
results show that not only the presence of the state in the ownership of a firm but also the
degree of the state ownership has a negative, statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful relationship with both the amount of bribes paid and the probability that corruption
is seen as an obstacle by a firm. In regional sub-samples, we find that the relationship is
particularly relevant in Europe and Central Asia but not for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America.
Several papers have looked empirically at the effect of privatisation on corruption. Fan et al.
(2009), who focus on the relationship between decentralisation and corruption, find that state
ownership decreases corruption. However, their state ownership measure is mainly used as
a control variable and the only information to which they have access is the presence of the
state in the capital of the firm, represented by a dummy variable coded as 1 if any state
agency or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm and 0 otherwise.
In contrast, we introduce a finer measure of state ownership since we use the percentage
of the firm that is owned by the state. This measure gives information not only on the
presence but also on the strength of this presence in the ownership of the firms. Analysing
the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Survey, Hellman et al. (2000) report that the
frequency of bribe payment as well as the average amount of bribes paid is higher for new
private firms compared to privatised and state owned enterprises. Arikan (2008) shows that
privatisation in the form of lower employment share of state economic enterprises fosters the
perception of corruption. This result is present in a sample of transition economies as well
as in general and is robust to different privatisation indicators.
In the same vein, Boubakri et al. (2009) show that large-scale privatisation in developing
countries increases the risk of corruption as defined in the International Country Risk Guide.
Focusing on utility companies with a firm-level dataset for 21 transition countries from
eastern Europe and Central Asia, Clarke and Xu (2004) find an ambiguous effect of ownership
on bribe payments. On the one hand, they find that de novo enterprises are more likely to pay
bribes because they have less political power. On the other hand, their results indicate that
on the supply side, that is on the part of the bribe takers utility employees, the privatisation
of utilities significantly decreases both the probability to pay bribes and its amount as share
of revenues. More recently, Koyuncu et al. (2010) focus on transition economies and regress
the same measure of privatisation as in Arikan (2008) on various macroeconomic indices of
corruption, taking into account the possibility of endogeneity in the relationship. In contrast
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to previous studies, their results exhibit a negative effect of all privatisation variables on
corruption. Note that most of these papers only look at the effect of the type of firms
(de novo, privatised, state-owned) or some proxy measure of privatisation on corruption.
In contrast, our state ownership variable allows us to consider a continuum of firms from
fully private to fully state-owned and to analyse the effect of marginal changes in ownership
structure on corruption.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simplified version of the Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) model and derives the main hypotheses regarding the link between state
ownership and corruption. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology used to test
this relationship. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes by discussing some
policy implications.
2 Theory
The model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) describes the relationship between the public, a
politician and a firm’s manager. The capital of the firm is owned in part κ ∈ [0, 1] by the
Treasury and in part (1 − κ) by the manager and shareholders. The manager is assumed
to follow the objectives of the shareholders. Let pi be the profit (assumed to be strictly
positive) of the firm before it interacts with the politician. Transfers between the politician
and the manager may occur in two ways: either from the politician to the manager in the
form of a subsidies t financed by the Treasury, or from the manager to the politician in the
form of a bribe. Thus Shleifer and Vishny (1994) envision several channels by which the
politicians might influence and corrupt firms managers. The politicians use a transfer from
the Treasury to firms with two objectives in mind. The first one is to partly finance obstacles
they impose on firms and that bring back a political benefit to them. These obstacles may
take the form of excess employment, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). For instance,
the government and the beneficiaries of this excess employment such as politically influential
labour unions may engage in a political market in which votes are exchanged for jobs, as
described by the public choice school. These obstacles may also take the form of regulations
(Svensson; 2003) or influence the production of goods in favour of the politician and his
political supporters at the expense of the general public. Second, bribes are a way for the
politicians to appropriate part of the public funds coming from the Treasury in the form of
transfers as well as some of the firm’s profit.
Since the Treasury owns part of the firm’s capital it considers the net transfer, which accounts
for the part of the transfer it receives and the expenditure induced by the constraint it is
liable for as a shareholder:
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T = t− κ(t−O)
= (1− κ)t+ κO, (1)
where O represents the obstacles the politician imposes on the manager. The net transfer
incurs a cost δ(T ) on the politician, reflecting the political constraint of using the public
funds of the Treasury for his own interest. On the other hand, the politician enjoys a benefit
γ(O) from the obstacles he imposes on the firm (γ
′
(O) > 0). Note that O, in contrast to the
bribe, does not fall in the politician’s pocket in the form of money. These obstacles might
be for example the employment of individuals that will favor his reelection as in Shleifer
and Vishny (1994). O could also capture politicians obliging managers to purchase other
(possibly inferior) non-labour inputs from sources beneficial to the politician. The utility of
the politician is given by:
Up = γ(O)− δ(T ) + b, (2)
where b is the amount of bribes paid and the utility of the manager reads:
Um = (1− κ)(pi + t−O)− b
= (1− κ)pi + T −O − b. (3)
(3) is found by substituting (1) in the utility of the manager. Note that the bribe, as an
informal payment, is not divided between the private and public shareholders (Treasury) of
the firm but is entirely borne by the manager (who is equivalent to the private shareholders
in this model).
We now turn to the objective and strategic variables of the politician. In contrast to Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) who allow the control right over the obstacles O to be devoted either
to the politician or to the firm, we assume that the choice over O is always under the
control of the politician. We focus on this case to make clear the effect of a change in the
ownership structure on both b and O. Thus the politician sets the level of obstacles O, the
net transfer T and the bribe b in order to maximize his utility (2) subject to the positive
utility participation constraint of the manager: (1 − κ)pi + T − O − b ≥ 0. The relevant
Lagrangian for this problem reads:
` = γ(O)− δ(T ) + b+ λ{(1− κ)pi + T −O − b}, (4)
and the FOCs are:
4
∂`
∂T
= −δ′(T ) + λ = 0, (5a)
∂`
∂O
= γ′(O)− λ = 0, (5b)
∂`
∂b
= 1− λ = 0, (5c)
∂`
∂λ
= (1− κ)pi + T −O − b = 0. (5d)
Simplifying yields:
γ′(O) = δ′(T ) = 1. (6)
The condition (6) may be viewed as two separate conditions over O and T . It means that
the politician extracts the maximum amount of transfers from the Treasury so as to finance
increases in the obstacles on firms that politically benefit to him. However the politician has
to balance the benefits of these obstacles with a political cost which occurs because of possible
sanction for the use of public funds for private interests, for instance in terms of decreasing
probability of being reelected. The transfer extraction from the Treasury continues until the
marginal political benefit of the obstacles is equal to the marginal political cost of the net
transfer. Then the politician extracts the bribe from the utility of the manager by pushing
him to zero net profit.
Totally differentiating the optimal condition on the net transfer from the Treasury (i.e.
δ′(T ) = 1), we can show, by substituting (5d), the effect of change in the degree of public
ownership in the enterprise on the level of the bribe:
∂b
∂κ
= −pi < 0. (7)
(7) indicates that an increase in the public ownership of the firm leads to a decrease in
the bribe imposed by the politician. The rationale behind this result is that a higher public
ownership drops the profit (1−κ)pi of the firm and thus the potential rent the politician is able
to extract from the manager. If O and T are constant, then a increase in κ implies a lower
bribe payment in order to keep (5d) unchanged. Differentiating the manager’s participation
constraint (5d), we also show that:
∂O
∂κ
= −pi − ∂b
∂κ
= 0, (8)
that is, a change in the ownership structure is neutral with respect to the level of obstacles.
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that this result is a variant of the Coase theorem. No
matter who owns the firm, the obstacles are set at the optimal level and bribes are used to
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compensate any deviation from this equilibrium, as we can see in the second term of the
RHS of (8). In the case where there are too little obstacles, the politician compensates the
manager by giving up bribes in order to increase obstacles up to the optimal level. If the
obstacles are too great, the manager compensates the politician by paying bribes in order
to reduce the obstacles to the optimal level.
3 Data
3.1 The Enterprise Surveys
To test the predictions of the Shleifer and Vishny (1994) model outlined above, namely that
state ownership reduces the amount paid in bribes by a firm and has no effect on the degree
to which corruption is an obstacle to a firm’s operations, we need measures of these two
outcomes. Until relatively recently such finely grained information on corruption was hard
to come by, especially if one desired internationally comparable data for a wide range of
countries. Recently however, the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and similar projects have
begun to document firms’ (self reported) experiences of corruption. The Enterprise Surveys
are representative firm level surveys that have been carried out in an increasing number
of developing and emerging economies as well as some more developed economies. They
provide a wide range of information on firms’ characteristics, the business environment they
operate in, and the constraints they face, be they legal, political or other. The dataset we
use contains over 55000 firm level observations from 105 countries though the sample size
we can use is dictated primarily by our choice of dependent variable. The full methodology
is available at the Enterprise Surveys website.1
3.2 Corruption Measures
To measure the amount of bribes paid, we make use of the following question:
We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes,
licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales,
or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal
payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?
Note that the question refers to “establishments like this” in order to help elicit truthful
responses. We use the data for those who chose to give the response in terms of total annual
informal payment rather than as a percent of total annual sales and refer to this as bribe.
1www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology
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We focus on this quantity for two main reasons. Firstly, the theory says nothing about the
quantity bribe/sales. Secondly, when we look at the data we can see that the vast majority
of non-zero responses to the bribe/sales question are multiples of 5. This suggests that
respondents were prone to rounding off their guess as to what the actual value was.2
Our second dependent variable is derived from a survey question that asks respondents if
corruption is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a major obstacle, or a very severe obstacle to the
current operations of their establishment. From this we create a dummy variable, Obstacle,
that takes a value of one if the firm feels that corruption is a major or very severe obstacle
and zero otherwise. This is our measure of O, the obstacles placed in the way of the firm by
the politician in the model above. Given that this O can be many different things as argued
above, the simplicity and openness of this question are desirable features.
3.3 State Ownership
Our explanatory variable of interest comes from a survey question that asks what percent-
age of the firm is owned by private domestic entities, private foreign entities, the govern-
ment/state, and “others”. From this we create a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if the state has any ownership in the firm in line with Fan et al. (2009). However we also
use the continuous nature of the variable. Thus we will be examining whether firms with
any state ownership have lesser corruption problems than those that do not and likewise,
and more in keeping with the theory, if firms with more state ownership do. Using a con-
tinuous variable also allows us to see if the relationship is non-linear - a possibility that the
theoretical model does not consider.
We drop 13 observations. These 13 firms all reported total annual informal payments in
excess of one million dollars (the next highest was roughly $800,000) and had reported
current or past sales that were either extremely high, equal to the reported bribe payment,
or greater than it. Including these 13 firms (12 from Sub-Saharan Africa and one from Latin
America) does not alter the findings in terms of the statistical significance of our main result
but greatly inflates the estimated relationships in the full sample and the Sub-Saharan Africa
sub-sample.
2When we do use bribe/sales as our dependent variable we find no relationship with state ownership
and it does not even predict whether bribe/sales was non-zero in probit models. Further, if we create a
new variable for bribe amount by multiplying bribe/sales by our variable measuring sales we fail to find
a relationship with state ownership. We also fail to find a relationship when we create a new bribe/sales
variable by dividing bribe by the sales variable in the dataset. Results available on request.
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3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the variables used in this paper. All variables bar
the data on GDP per capita data come from the Enterprise Surveys. The GDP per capita
variable comes from the World Development Indicators. All monetary responses from the
survey data have been adjusted for prices and converted to US dollars. We also report the
summary statistics for the sub-samples of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Europe and Central
Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LCA) and Rest of the World (ROW). The
average firm pays $2746 in informal payments per year though this varies substantially, both
in terms of standard deviations and in terms of global region. Roughly 20% of firms have
had to pay at least something in bribes though again this varys across the globe with 42%
of firms in SSA paying a bribe and only 6% of firms in our ECA sample and 11% in our
LCA sample doing so.
However when we look at the Obstacle variable we can see that the story is somewhat dif-
ferent with 40% of firms overall feeling that corruption is an obstacle to their operations.
The number is still high when we look at the ECA sample and is comparable to the SSA
value while the LCA sample displays a substantially higher value. Whether this is due to
different modalities of corruption manifesting differently in different (general) environments
or is due to a propensity to over or under “complain” about corruption is an open question.
Corruption could be a hinderance to firms beyond bribes as outlined above and even firms
that are not involved in corruption may feel it is a problem if it helps their rivals to succeed,
discourages investment from abroad (e.g. Wei (2000a), Wei (2000b), and Habib and Zuraw-
icki (2002)) lowers the quality of infrastrucutre (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Bose et al.
(2008), and Gillanders (2014)) or leads to one of the other myriad problems identified in the
corruption literature. This difference between the relative levels of each variable certainly
reinforces the need to look at both measures beyond the theoretical motivation and assertion
that both are important and distinct modalities of corruption.
The average firm in our dataset has very little state ownership. Only 0.66% of a firm is
owned by the state on average though this is somewhat higher in ECA at 1.5%. However
we can see that standard deviations are large and that there are firms in every sample with
some degree of state ownership. While only 1.6% of firms overall have some state ownership,
the proportion in ECA is appreciable at 3.7%.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Full Sub-Saharan Europe and Latin America Rest of
Sample Africa Central Asia and Caribbean the World
Bribe 2746.253 6583.454 909.688 1884.423 3824.196
(25760.070) (38883.900) (14804.290) (25908.170) (19288.570)
17458 4132 7254 4680 1392
Bribe Dummy 0.213 0.418 0.057 0.113 0.753
(0.409) (0.493) (0.232) (0.316) (0.431)
17458 4132 7254 4680 1392
Obstacle 0.400 0.329 0.352 0.490 0.344
(0.490) (0.470) (.478) (0.500) (0.475)
53532 13984 11874 21324 6350
State Ownership Dummy 0.016 0.013 0.037 0.004 0.019
(0.125) (0.115) (0.189) (0.064) (0.138)
54470 14187 12436 21134 6713
State Ownership Percentage 0.662 0.572 1.547 0.153 0.812
(6.368) (6.108) (9.729) (3.011) (6.638)
54470 14187 12436 21134 6713
Foreign Ownership Percentage 10.064 13.768 7.663 9.353 8.916
(28.295) (32.592) (24.669) (27.417) (26.740)
54457 14189 12436 21120 6712
Exporter Dummy 0.235 0.118 0.286 0.282 0.238
(0.424) (0.323) (0.452) (0.450) (0.426)
55086 14189 12518 21667 6712
Natural Log of Sales 13.270 12.104 13.955 13.851 12.818
(2.367) (2.288) (2.149) (2.219) (2.274)
50103 13728 10629 19716 6030
Natural Log of GDP per Capita 7.425 6.285 7.779 8.198 6.623
(1.163) (1.038) (0.862) (0.688) (0.564)
54743 14239 12551 21717 6236
Notes: The first entries in the table are means. Standard deviations are given in parentheses and the number of observations is in
italics.
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4 Empirical Specification and Results
4.1 Empirical Specification
To test the theoretical predictions regarding the responses of b and O to a change in κ we
estimate models of the following form:
bribei = α0 + β1SOWNi + β2FOWNi + β3EXPi + β4SALESi + β5GDPPCi + i (9)
Pr(obstaclei = 1) = Φ(ζ1SOWNi + ζ2FOWNi + ζ3EXPi + ζ4SALESi + ζ5GDPPCi + νi)
(10)
where the former is estimated by OLS and the later is a probit model. bribei and obstaclei
are our measures of b and O respectively. It must be noted that since this measure of O is
discrete rather than continuous we do not have a direct test of ∂O∂κ . However it seems logical
to assume that there is a positive relationship between the level of O and the probability
that it is seen as a serious problem. We refine this somewhat by using an ordered probit
model as a robustness test. SOWNi is our measure of κ, the degree of state ownership in
the firm. i and νi are error terms of the usual type.
We control for several factors suggested by our intuition and by the existing literature. First
we control for the degree of foreign ownership FOWNi as such firms may stand in different
relation to bureaucrats than others, could be more or less willing (and able) to pay bribes,
and may present a more guilt-free target to officials. Firms that export may come into
contact with more, and different, officials and so we include a dummy (EXPi) that takes a
value of one if some of the firm’s sales are not national sales. Like Fan et al. (2009) we control
for the size of the firm using the natural logarithm of sales (SALESi). If we use dummies
for the size of the firm in terms of number of employees we obtain the same results. Finally
we control for the level of GDP per capita (GDPPCi) in the firm’s country in line with
the long standing literature that has found that GDP per capita is a significant factor in
determining perceptions of corruption. Good examples of this finding are Ades and Di Tella
(1999), and Svensson (2005). This may help to deal somewhat with the potential for some
cultures at certain stages of the development process to be more prone to “complaining”
about corruption than others.
We also include dummies for industry as some industries are more likely to lend themselves
to both state ownership and to corruption. For similar reasons, we cluster the standard
errors by groups defined by industry and country. This allows errors to be correlated within
industry-country groups. When we split our sample we use more traditional robust standard
errors as the number of clusters can get relatively small. If we do use the clustered standard
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errors with our splits, the only important difference is that bribe is significant at 5% in our
SSA sample as opposed to 10%.
4.2 Basic Results
Table 2 presents our main results. Column 1 shows that having any degree of state ownership
lowers the total annual informal payment by almost $4000. This is clearly an economically
meaningful quantity and the result is highly statistically significant. Turning to Column 2,
we can see that when we refine this by using the continuous nature of the data we still find a
highly statistically significant and economically meaningful result. Each percentage of state
ownership lowers the bribe paid by about $125. We find only slight evidence of a non-linear
effect. The squared term is positive though of negligible estimated size and is only significant
at 10%. The results suggest that a firm with 10% state ownership will pay roughly $1250
less in bribes per year than similar firms while an entirely state owned firm will pay $12500
less. These sums, while not astronomical, are unlikely to be inconsequential for most firms.
The theoretical prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that the bribes paid by firms should
decrease with the level of state ownership seems to hold true in general, though as we will
soon see it does not appear to hold in every environment.
Foreign ownership operates similarly to state ownership though to a smaller degree. Each
percentage of foreign ownership tends to reduce the annual bribe burden by around $20, a
small but statistically significant amount. This is worth contrasting with Fan et al. (2009)
who found that any foreign ownership significantly decreased the frequency of bribery but
not the amount (as a percentage of sales, categorically measured). Larger firms tend to pay
significantly and substantially more in bribes whereas the opposite is true for firms in richer
countries.
There are clearly concerns one might have with self-reported bribe information. One ro-
bustness check we can run is to discard most of the information and simply look at whether
state ownership predicts that at least some amount is paid in bribes. We can see in Column
3 that each percentage of state ownership reduces the probability of having to pay anything
in bribes by about 0.4%. While this may seem small at first, it is a statistically significant
result and implies that a firm with 10% state ownership is 4% less likely to have to pay any
bribes at all relative to similar firms with no state ownership. Certainly, it is an effect that
dwarves that of foreign ownership. In this specification we find a role for exporter status
with exporters being nearly 5% more likely to have to pay a bribe. Larger firms are no more
or less likely to pay a bribe though firms in richer countries are less likely to do so.
The remaining columns of Table 2 address the second prediction of the Shleifer and Vishny
(1994) model outlined above. We can see from Column 4 that firms with any state ownership
11
Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Bribe Bribe Dummy Obstacle
Constant 6121.39∗∗ 6101.37∗∗
(2754.14) (2753.14)
State Ownership Dummy -3992.01∗∗∗ -0.0844∗∗∗
(967.91) (0.0201)
State Ownership Percentage -125.24∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗
(35.18) (0.0019) (0.0015)
State Ownership Percentage Squared 0.66∗ 0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Foreign Ownership Percentage -20.24∗∗ -20.60∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(9.98) (10.04) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Exporter Dummy 128.99 122.95 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0014
(723.75) (724.43) (0.0171) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Natural Log of Sales 1569.65∗∗∗ 1569.82∗∗∗ -0.0012 0.0003 0.0004
(308.58) (308.77) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Natural Log of GDP per Capita -2915.31∗∗ -2914.71∗∗∗ -0.1481∗∗∗ 0.0065 0.0064
(597.63) (598.06) (0.0119) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0229 0.0229
Observed Probability 0.2363 0.3928 0.3928
Predicted Probability 0.1929 0.3923 0.3923
N 15428 15428 15428 47557 47557
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report OLS coefficients. Columns 3, 4 and 5 report probit marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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tend to be around 8% less likely to feel that corruption is an obstacle to their operations.
Once again this is an economically meaningful result and is highly statistically significant.
However this empricial result is in contradiction with the theoretical model presented above
that predicts that there is no relationship between obstacles and onwnership. However,
this contradiction is explicable if we consider that the theoretical result relies on the Coase
theorm.
A well known critique of the Coase theorem is that it may not apply if many contracting
agents (in our case the politicians or the managers) have to agree on a compensation scheme
to reach the optimal level of obstacles. Suppose that state ownership uniformly decreases
in every firm. In order for the incentive compatibility constraint to hold, obstacles should
decrease (holding b constant). Following the Coase theorem, the managers should pay more
bribes in order to come back to the optimal level of obstacles. But if there are many
managers, any individual player finds himself ia a classical prisoner’s dilemma. It is his
interest to free ride on the compensation scheme and to let the other managers agree to a
level of bribe payment in order to obtain less obstacles. This is because he will benefit from
the decrease in obstacles without paying for it. As a consequence, no bribe compensation
will emerge to counteract the negative effect of κ on O and the second term, db/dκ, in the
RHS of (8) will vanish. The same argument applies if there are too little obstacles and
many politicians on the political market. In these conditions, it is not surprising to find this
result that contradicts the ideal case of the model where there is only one politician and one
manager.
The final column shows that this result holds when using the continuous measure of state
ownership. As mentioned above, this is not a direct test of the theoretical prediction as we
do not have a continuous measure of O but it seems logical to assume that there is a strong
link between the level O and the probability of it being seen as an obstacle. Thus we have
empirical evidence that, contrary to the prediction of the Shleifer and Vishny (1994) model,
more state ownership decreases the obstacles placed in the way of the firm by corruption.3
We also allowed for the possibility that this relationship is non-linear by including a squared
state ownership term. It seems plausible that while certain levels of state ownership may
shield firms from corruption, extreme levels of state ownership may make a firm the readily
exploitable fiefdom of certain officials. On the other hand, extreme levels of state ownership
could perhaps reinforce the beneficial effect. The results suggest that the former is true
though this non-linear effect is not very large relative to the effect of the level of state
ownership. Foreign ownership also matters though once again it matters to a much lesser
degree than state ownership. The other variables are all insignificant.
3If we include bribe as an additional control, state ownership is still highly significant and the marginal
effect is larger in magnitude (almost 0.9%).
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As argued by Shleifer (1998), the level of corruption in a society might have an influence
on the structure of ownership. In particular, a highly corrupt government might be less
willing to privatise. In other words, state ownership and corruption may be endogenous.
Unfortunately, we lack suitable variables that we could use as instruments for state ownership
in the current context. Indeed it is difficult to think of what such instruments could be.
However, the nature of our data on corruption make us confident about our results: while it
is plausible the overall level of corruption influences the state ownership policy, it is less likely
that individual firms’ experiences of corruption directly have such effect.4 Further, the model
of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) on which we are basing our analysis provides a strong, logical
and, we feel, convincing argument for the existence of a clear causal mechanism through
which the degree of state ownership helps determine a firm’s experience of corruption.
4.3 Extensions
To get somewhat closer to the theoretical quantity O and to provide a sensible robust test,
we made use of the full range of information provided by the survey question from which
we created Obstacle. Table 3 presents the results of this exercise. More state ownership is
associated with a lower probability of a firm feeling that corruption is a moderate, major,
or very severe obstacle to their operations and a higher probability of feeling that is is
no obstacle or a minor obstacle. Thus we can conclude that our findings with regards to
Obstacle are not the result of the specific way we use the data.
The conclusions one can draw often vary dramatically by the global region under consid-
eration. Certain regions have tended to have different experiences of state ownership. It
is generally good practice to split ones sample by broad geographical region and it makes
particular sense to do so in the context of state ownership and corruption. For example, the
former Soviet states and satellites that can be found in our ECA sample will tend to have
had very different histories of state ownership and control than the countries in our other
samples. Similarly, corruption and general institutional malaise is more common and severe
in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions of the globe. Corruption may be so endemic in
these countries that the theoretical mechanisms outlined above may be irrelevant.
Table 4 presents the results of our two specifications run on our 4 groups of countries.
Only in the ECA sample do we see strong evidence in favour of the theoretical hypothesis
regarding bribe. The magnitude of the relationship between bribes paid and state ownership
is considerably smaller than in the full sample at $50 but it is highly significant as is the
squared term. The findings in terms of Obstacle are quite similar to those in the full sample.
In SSA, we find no strong evidence of either relationship. We suspect that this is due
to the pervasive nature of corruption in SSA. That said, as the state ownership variable
4This argument is similar to that of Fan et al. (2009) in their context of decentralization and corruption.
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects for Corruption as an Obstacle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Obstacle Minor Obstacle Moderate Obstacle Major Obstacle Very Severe Obstacle
State Ownership Percentage 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0009)
State Ownership Percentage Squared -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Foreign Ownership Percentage 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Exporter Dummy -0.0064 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0021 0.0051
(0.0072) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0023) (0.0059)
Natural Log of Sales -0.0032∗ -0.0005∗ 0.0001 0.0010∗ 0.0026∗
(0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0015)
Natural Log of GDP per Capita -0.0091 -0.0014 0.0003 0.0030 0.0073
(0.0065) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0052)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level and are reported in parentheses. ∗,
∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. N = 47557
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Table 4: Sample Splits by Global Region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Global Region: Sub-Saharan Europe and Latin America Rest of
Africa Central Asia and Caribbean the World
Dependent Variable: Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle
Constant -26926.00∗∗∗ -2448.57 -1364.91 -39264.17∗∗∗
(6968.57) (1660.12) (6394.32) (11517.30)
State Ownership Percentage -430.13∗ 0.0040∗ -49.60∗∗∗ -0.0062∗∗∗ 220.56 -0.0056 -61.34 -0.0133∗∗∗
(241.15) (0.0023) (15.30) (0.0018) (298.36) (0.0036) (93.40) (0.0032)
State Ownership Percentage Squared 1.24 -0.0001∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ -2.49 0.0000 0.06 0.0001∗∗∗
(2.55) (0.0000) (0.15) (0.0000) (3.07) (0.0000) (1.18) (0.0000)
Foreign Ownership Percentage -103.83∗∗∗ -0.0002 -9.84∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -6.04 -0.0003∗∗ 12.13 -0.0009∗∗∗
(26.11) (0.0001) (5.40) (0.0002) (11.73) (0.0001) (39.30) (0.0003)
Exporter Dummy 4024.89 0.0264∗ 134.05 -0.0188 732.66 0.0082 1978.81 0.0166
(3069.01) (0.0139) (559.61) (0.0119) (957.88) (0.0090) (1496.98) (0.0185)
Natural Log of Sales 5184.20∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 314.56∗∗∗ -0.0005 592.59∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ 1046.13∗∗ -0.0019
(719.55) (0.0021) (95.24) (0.0026) (159.44) (0.0019) (478.36) (0.0034)
Natural Log of GDP per Capita -4033.39∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗ -112.48 -0.0675∗∗∗ 184.83 -0.1241∗∗∗ 4463.01∗ -0.0730∗∗∗
(553.79) (0.0041) (204.85) (0.0060) (454.30) (0.0056) (2285.90) (0.0131)
Sector Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0800 0.0050 0.0094 0.06
Observed Probability 0.3243 0.3412 0.4878 0.3257
Predicted Probability 0.3227 0.3383 0.4876 0.3212
N 4026 13437 6081 10008 3942 18831 1379 5281
Notes: Columns where “Bribe” is the dependent variable report OLS coefficients. Columns where “Obstacle” is the dependent variable
report probit marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗and ∗∗∗indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
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is significant at 10% and the magnitude of the association with bribe is rather large and
negative, policymakers thinking about privitisation or reducing corruption in SSA may be
interested in these results, though the association with Obstacle is positive. In LAC we don’t
see any evidence of either relationship and in the RoW sample we only find a relationship
with Obstacle, though this is a rather small and heterogeneous sample.
Finally, we looked for specific ways in which state ownership might make corruption less
of an obstacle for firms. We failed to find any relationship between the degree of state
ownership and the probability of having to pay a bribe in the specific circumstances of
obtaining a construction permit, during tax inspections, obtaining an operating license, or
with the percentage of a government contract that must be paid in informal gifts in order
to secure the contract. At the macro level Breen and Gillanders (2012) found that the level
of corruption in a country was a determinant of the ease of doing business in that country.
However, we also failed to find a relationship between state ownership and bureaucratic
constraints such as the days it takes for imports and exports to clear customs, time spent
dealing with government regulations, losses due to crime, and the probability of the firm
finding any of the following to be an obstacle to their operations: tax administration, the
courts, obtaining business licenses and permits, zoning, and customs. Once again these
findings, full results of which are available on request, stand somewhat in contrast with
those of Fan et al. (2009) who found a link between their state ownership dummy and the
frequency of bribery for purposes of business licenses, tax collection, government contracts,
public utilities, customs, and the courts. We tentatively propose that these results suggest
that the Obstacle variable is capturing the outcomes of machine type politics (e.g. “jobs for
the boys”).
5 Conclusions
Using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys we have found partial empirical sup-
port for the theoretical predictions of the model presented in Shleifer and Vishny (1994).
The percentage of state ownership in a firm significantly and substantially decreases the
amount of bribes that the firm has to pay and reduces the probability that corruption is
seen as an obstacle to the firm’s operations. The second result, while not consistent with the
prediction the model, is easily explained by free-riding incentives that invalidate the Coase
theorem. Specifically, we found in our baseline estimation that each additional one percent-
age of state ownership reduces the total annual informal payment by $125 and decreases by
about 0.5% the probability that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their
current operations. As one might expect, there is substantial regional heterogeneity.
Our results have practical policy implications. Policy makers, at least in Europe and Central
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Asia, who are concerned about reducing corruption may wish to reconsider their attitudes to
privatisation. We have shown that any degree of state involvement in ownership is beneficial
in terms of a firm’s experiences of corruption. Of course we are not saying that privatisation
is a bad policy. Though Birdsall and Nellis (2003) argue that privatisation is perhaps not a
good policy in terms of equality, there is a long standing literature that tends to conclude
that privatisation is good in terms of efficiency. Eckel et al. (1997) show this in the specific
case of the privatisation of British Airways and Megginson and Netter (2001) and Estrin
et al. (2009) provide good overviews of this literature. Gupta (2005) shows that even partial
privatisation has a positive effect on firm performance.
This paper raises the possibility of the existence of a trade off between the efficiency benefits
and the corruption costs of privatisation. Decreasing the degree of state ownership in a firm
in order to achieve the performance gains commonly found in the literature will probably be
done at the cost of an increased burden of corruption on the firm and thus on society. While
the result of this trade off is beyond the scope of this paper, our empirical findings and the
theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stress that the case for privatisation is less
obvious than some might think and many previous studies have suggested.
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